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S T A R T arrow Inne polityczne arrow globaliści, ich metody arrow Wyjątki z dokumentu "KNOWN UNKNOWNS: UNCONVENTIONAL STRATEGIC SHOCKS"
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Na wątpliwości ludzi; „Czy tyle miliardów w ogóle było, by je zrabować??
Nie rabuje się banknotów, lecz papiery dłużne, zobowiązania itp. Za to uzyskuje się udziały w bankach, w wielkich mediach, fabryki – też te do „wrogiego przejęcia”. Dalej - „piniądz robi piniądz”, ale nie bogacą się najlepsi, najaktywniejsi, lecz udziałowcy brutalnych tajnych związków. Skutki - przez utratę nadziei - też demograficzne [wsp. dzietności zamiast trzy, jest 1.29 - 1.34 – czyli zagłada narodu].

 
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Wyjątki z dokumentu "KNOWN UNKNOWNS: UNCONVENTIONAL STRATEGIC SHOCKS" Drukuj Email
Wpisał: Mirosław Dakowski   
30.12.2008.

Wyjątki z dokumentu "KNOWN UNKNOWNS: UNCONVENTIONAL STRATEGIC SHOCKS"  IN DEFENSE STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT"   Nathan Freier'a  z Strategic Studies Institute United States Army War College  na temat szoku strategicznego. November 2008  DoD – to Department of Defense . Całość tu: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB890.pdf   całość fascynująca,mądry, dalekowzroczny tekst.

motto całości: A thoughtful senior policy official has opined that most potentially devastating threats to U.S. interests start being evaluated as unlikely. Jack Davis

tu wyjątki ze stron 30-32:

             [...]  One of the most dangerous prospective contingencies in this regard might be collapse of a large capable state that results in a nuclear civil war. Uncontrolled proliferation in the event of a nuclear state’s collapse is an ever-present threat. However, here also DoD would have to contend with stabilization in the aftermath of nuclear use. It might be the lead agent in reassertion of responsible control over substantial nuclear weapons capabilities. Finally, it would likely be responsible for the armed separation of nuclear-armed opponents and the deliberate disarmament of the various parties to the conflict. All of this would occur under the constant threat of continued nuclear use within or outside the confines of the victim state.

Violent, Strategic Dislocation Inside the United States.

As a community, the defense establishment swears to protect and defend the constitution against all enemies foreign and domestic. DoD’s role in combating “domestic enemies” has never been thoughtfully examined. Thus, there is perhaps no greater source of strategic shock for DoD than operationalizing that component of the oath of service in a widespread domestic emergency that entails rapid dissolution of public order in all or significant parts of the United States.

While likely not an immediate prospect, this is clearly a “Black Swan” that merits some visibility inside DoD and the Department of Homeland Security. To the extent events like this involve organized violence against local, state, and national authorities and exceed the capacity of the former two to restore public order and protect vulnerable populations, DoD would be required to fill the gap. This is largely uncharted strategic territory.

Widespread civil violence inside the United States would force the defense establishment to reorient priorities in extremis to defend basic domestic order and human security. Deliberate employment of weapons of mass destruction or other catastrophic capabilities, unforeseen economic collapse, loss of functioning political and legal order, purposeful domestic resistance or insurgency, pervasive public health emergencies, and catastrophic natural and human disasters are all paths to disruptive domestic shock.

An American government and defense establishment lulled into complacency by a long-secure domes-tic order would be forced to rapidly divest some or most external security commitments in order to address rapidly expanding human insecurity at home. Already predisposed to defer to the primacy of civilian authorities in instances of domestic security and divest all but the most extreme demands in areas like civil support and consequence management, DoD might be forced by circumstances to put its broad resources at the disposal of civil authorities to contain and reverse violent threats to domestic tranquility. Under the most extreme circumstances, this might include use of military force against hostile groups inside the United States. Further, DoD would be, by necessity, an essential enabling hub for the continuity of political authority in a multi-state or nationwide civil conflict or disturbance.

A whole host of long-standing defense conventions would be severely tested. Under these conditions and at their most violent extreme, civilian authorities, on advice of the defense establishment, would need to rapidly determine the parameters defining the legitimate use of military force inside the United States. Further still, the whole concept of conflict termination and/or transition to the primacy of civilian security institutions would be uncharted ground. DoD is already challenged by stabilization abroad. Imagine the challenges associated with doing so on a massive scale at home.

Politics, Economics, Social Action, and Political Violence as Hybrid War.

The United States might also consider the prospect that hostile state and/or nonstate actors might individually or in concert combine hybrid methods

 [....]

Zmieniony ( 30.12.2008. )
 
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